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Abstract:
This paper argues that a generalized model of social preferences must simultaneously pass two 
tests; the Variety Test (explain outcomes under variety, the V-test) and the Psychological Test 
(conform to psychological intuition, the P-test). It is shown that none of the models proposed to 
date unconditionally passes these tests. The paper extends the Fehr and Schmidt model of 
inequality-aversion to a generalized model of inequity-aversion which parsimoniously explains 
interior outcomes in the dictator game and dynamics of outcomes in other games. This is done 
through introducing the equity-bias in the Fehr and Schmidt model. The paper postulates that a 
player’s idea of equitable distribution is state-dependent, where the state is determined by 
psychological and structural parameters. The state could be fair, superior or inferior. Individuals in 
a fair state have zero equity-bias and split the pie evenly. Those in a superior (inferior) state have 
positive (negative) equity-bias and value more (less) than fair distribution as equitable.  
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1. Introduction 
Economic agents are typically modeled as self-regarding selfish beings whose 
welfare is unaffected by welfare of others in the society. There have been long 
concerns about validity of the self-regarding assumption and calls to take other-
regarding preferences seriously in economic theorizing. This assumption has 
heavily been under attack in recent years and efforts to take other-regarding 
preferences seriously escalated due to laboratory experiments in experimental and 
behavioral economics. These experiments suggest that individuals value fairness 
and some, if not all, behave altruistically and when allowed to do so, some 
sacrifice their self-interest to supposedly punish unfairness. This, naturally, led 
theoretical economists to look for theories that could explain the sort of behavior 
exhibited by subjects in these experiments. The main focus of this area of research 
has been to identify other-regarding individual-specific utility or social welfare 
functions that could explain patterns of behavior, such as fairness and reciprocity, 
observed in data from laboratory experiments. Literature in this area is expanding 
rapidly and so is variety of the proposed models. These models include both linear 
(such as Fehr and Schmidt 1999;  Charness and Rabin 2002;  Levine 1998; 
Rotemberg 2004; and Erlei 2004), and nonlinear models (such as Bolton and 
Ockenfels 2000; Cox et al. 2004; Ottone and Ponzano 2005; and Cox et al. 2007).  
Noting that altering the utility function allows one to explain just anything, 
Camerer (2003, p 101) writes 
“The goal is not to explain every different finding by adjusting the utility 
function just so; the goal is to find parsimonious utility functions, 
supported by psychological intuition, that are general enough to explain 
many phenomena in one fell swoop, and also make new predictions” 
Models proposed in this area of research however haven’t been subjected to any 
formal tests to analyze their ability to explain many phenomenon in one fell 
swoop and ensure their conformity to psychological intuition. This paper 
formalizes Camerer’s idea in the form of two theoretical tests that can be used to 
judge models of other-regarding preferences. The two tests are (i) the Variety test 
(V-Test) and (ii) the Psychological test (P-Test). This paper applies these tests to 
representative models of the literature and demonstrates that none of the models 
proposed to date passes these tests simultaneously. They fail to support 
psychological intuition when put to such a theoretical test, and most are not 
general enough to explain many phenomena in one fell swoop and do well in 
experiments of specific designs only. The paper than proposes a generalized 
model of inequity-aversion that passes the two tests simultaneously. This is done 
through introducing equity-bias in the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model.  
Individuals in the Fehr and Schmidt’s model are inequality averse. Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999, p.822) justifies inequality-aversion by arguing that subjects enter 
the laboratory as equals who are randomly assigned different roles and do not 
know anything about each other. This paper highlights the difference between 
inequity and inequality and argues that individuals are inequity-averse than 
inequality-averse. This is because subjects cease to be equal once assigned into 3 
different roles and given unequal property rights through whatever procedure. A 
dictator, for example, with all the power to give something or nothing to another 
player is not equal to the passive recipient who has no claim over the amount 
given to him/her. This bias in roles leads to bias in equity which is referred to as 
equity-bias. It argues that, in general, an individual’s idea of equitable distribution 
is state-dependent where state is determined by psychological and structural 
parameters. The state could be fair, superior or inferior. Individuals in a fair state 
have zero equity-bias and split the pie evenly. Those in a superior (inferior) state 
have positive (negative) equity-bias and value more (less) than fair distribution as 
equitable distribution. i.e. bias in state leads to bias, not necessarily with the 
negative connotation,  in equity. Given psychological tendencies of an individual, 
every experimental design or real world scenario assigns one of the three states to 
the player which leads to individual-specific valuation of equity and equitable 
outcomes.  
Before going into details of the paper, let me point out that this paper will 
limit its discussion to the two most frequently used standard games, namely, the 
dictator game (DG) and the ultimatum game (UG). In the DG, a player called the 
dictator is given a certain amount of money with the option to share it with 
another player, the recipient, in any proportion, 0 to 100 percent, inclusive. In the 
UG, the dictator is lowered to the status of a proposer and the recipient is 
alleviated to the status of a responder who is allowed to either accept or reject a 
distribution proposed by the proposer. When accepted, each player keeps his/her 
share and when rejected both players get zero. 
The model is developed in a two-player environment but results are applicable 
to games with multiple players competing or otherwise. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section   2 introduces the two 
theoretical tests that can be used to judge models of other-regarding preferences. 
Section   3 provides a review of selected models representative of previous 
literature and evaluates their performance against the V-test and the P-test. 
Section   4 provides a discussion on equity vs equality and spells out the concept of 
equity-bias. Section   5 formally introduces the state-dependent/equity-bias model 
of inequity aversion. This section details dynamics of the model in the dictator 
and  ultimatum games. Section   6 gives a brief comparison of the generalized 
model with those reviewed in Section   4. Section   7 discusses application of the 
model to different versions of the dictator and ultimatum games experiments 
conducted in the literature. Finally, Section   8 concludes the paper.  
2. Theoretical Tests for Judging Models of Other-
regarding Preferences 
A number of theoretical models have been proposed to explain the patterns of 
behavior observed during laboratory experiments. The number has continually 
being increasing and so has variety of the models proposed. This section identifies 
two theoretical tests that can be used to decide whether or not a mathematical 
model can be accepted as a generalized model of other-regarding preferences. 
These tests are discussed below. 4 
2.1.  The Variety Test (V-Test) 
Variety of the laboratory experiments conducted in this area has grown richer and 
different versions of the games have been experimented with. A reasonable model 
should be general enough to perform consistently across (i) different/similar 
designs of the same game (e.g. across different versions of the DG and UG) and 
(ii) across different games of the same nature (e.g. across the dictator, ultimatum 
and impunity games). This test has been applied, not under the name V-test 
though, in the literature, as we will note in our discussion later.  
2.2.  The Psychological Test (P-Test) 
As mentioned earlier, the main focus of the models in this area of research has 
been to explain patterns of the behavior observed during laboratory experiments. 
Whether or not a mathematical model that is able to explain outcomes in 
laboratory experiments conforms to psychological intuition is something that is 
often ignored and not tested for. The question however to ask is, is there any such 
test that can be used, together with some other test(s), to give a mathematical 
model the status of an other-regarding welfare function? Fortunately, there is at 
least one, Sen’s Weak Equity Axiom. Think of two individuals, one normal and 
the other with a disability. The disabled person is less efficient in converting a 
dollar into utility relative to the normal person. Psychological intuition tells us 
that when distributing a given sum, one should be more altruistic towards the 
disabled person than towards the normal person. This is Sen’s Weak Equity 
Axiom. The disability can be interpreted in general as poor socio-economic status. 
An even weaker version of the axiom is that the disabled person should be given 
at least as much as the normal person. Conformity to Sen’s WEA can be checked 
through the sign of partial derivative of equilibrium pay-offs with respect to 
dollar-to-utility conversion efficiency of a player. 
Formally, let Vi=Vi(u(xi),u(xj/) be the social utility of an individual i where 
xi is the pay-off of an individual i,  u(xi) the selfish utility of i from xi, xj is the 
pay-off of individual  j and u(xj/ the selfish utility of individual j from xj.  
quantifies the inefficiency of individual j in converting xj into utility relative to i. 
The larger the value of  the less efficient j is in converting a dollar into utility. 
The player’s objective is to maximize Vi subject to a constraint (such as xi+xj=N 
where N is size of the pie). Let xi* and xj* be the equilibrium pay-offs after 
maximization. Sen’s WEA requires d(xj*)/d>0.  
In fact the P-test can be thought of as a special case of the V-test. It is a V-test 
that invokes variations in as the change in structural parameters. Experiments 
show that Sen’s WEA is satisfied. Eckel and Grossman, (1996) found a significant 
increase in donations in a dictator game when they increased the extent to which a 
donation goes to a “deserving” recipient. Bra as-Garza (2006) performed three 
different  dictator games; the standard DG and two versions of the DG with 
poverty where the dictator is informed that their recipients were poor. Garza found 
that giving in the poverty game was significantly higher than in the standard DG.  
Notice that social utility of the individual i, Vi, is related to pay-offs through 
idiosyncratic selfish utility (ui and uj) and is not expressed as a direct function of 
the pay-offs alone. This distinction is important from point of view of the 
application of the P-test.  5 
3. Literature Review and Application of the Two 
Tests
This section reviews selected models of other-regarding preferences. These 
models include the FS model (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), the BO model (Bolton 
and Ockenfels, 2000) and the CFG model (Cox, and Friedman and Gjerstad, 
2007). The following justifies selection of the models in this section. 
The model in this paper is primarily an extension of the FS model. The paper 
therefore starts the review with the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model which is 
representative of piecewise linear models of inequality aversion. Results of the 
analysis therefore apply to any model with inequity modeled as inequality, such as 
Charness and Rabin (2002) and Erlei (2004). Appendix A demonstrates as an 
example that the FS model, or a restricted version of it, can be derived as a 
monotonic transformation of Charness and Rabin (2002). The same can be done 
for other piecewise linear models of the same sort such as Kohler (2003).  
As well known, the FS model cannot explain interior solutions in the DG. Fehr 
and Schmidt attribute this flaw to the piecewise linearity of preferences in 
advantageous inequity. They claim that modifying their social welfare function to 
introduce non-linearity in the advantageous inequity could resolve the issue (Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999 p. 823). Whereas this is true, this paper shows that nonlinearity 
is not necessarily needed to explain interior outcomes. The BO model can be 
shown to be the FS model with the proposed non-linearity. This is the reason why 
this model is reviewed as well and will be analyzed in the next section. Although I 
do not review other nonlinear models, the analysis in this paper is also applicable 
to other nonlinear models such as Ottone and Ponzano (2005). 
Finally, most recently, Cox  et al. (2007) proposed a parametric model of 
other-regarding preferences which depends on status, reciprocity, and perceived 
property rights. This allowed them to make distribution state-dependent, unlike 
the unconditional distributional preferences in the FS type models, which makes it 
similar to the model proposed in this paper. The CFG model is shown to be a 
special case of the generalized model when some additional restrictions are 
imposed and is therefore reviewed and analyzed in this section.  
Apart from the distributional preference models above, as mentioned by Cox 
et al. (2007), there are alternative models of intention-based reciprocity (such as 
Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; and Falk and Fischbacher 2001). 
These alternative models are complex and have many equilibria which makes 
them intractable in most applications (Cox. et al. 2007). Although I do not review 
intention-based models, the model proposed in this paper captures dynamics 
generated by intentions and encompasses this class of models as well. The 
analysis on the FS model in this section also applies to Levine (1998) who 
developed a simple tractable model with intentions where utilities are linear in 
one’s own and the other’s pay-offs. 
3.1.  The FS (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) model 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) used a simple linear model to explain results of 
laboratory experiments including the dictator and ultimatum games. They 
modeled fairness as self-centered inequity- in fact inequality- aversion, whereby 
people are willing to sacrifice part of their material pay-offs to move in the 
direction of equality. Assuming two players in the game, their social welfare function of an individual i is linearly increasing in self-pay-off, xi, decreasing in 
advantageous and disadvantageous inequality, i.e. 
    ,0 ,0            0 1   and   iii ij i ji i i Vx m a x xx m a x xx i   	 	 	 	 

      (1) 
i   is the social marginal utility when disadvantageous inequality ( ) 
reduces by 1 unit. Similarly, 
0 ij xx 	
i   is the social marginal utility when advantageous 
inequality( ) decreases by 1 unit.  0 ij xx 	 ii    implies that a unit increase in 
disadvantageous inequality hurts i more than a unit increase in advantageous 
inequality would.  
Consider application of the model to the DG. Assuming D and R to be pay-offs of 
the dictator and recipient respectively, we can write social utility of the dictator, 
based on equation (1), as: 
  max ,0 max ,0 DD D VD D R R D  	 	 	 	  
The dictator’s objective it to maximizes VD subject to D+R=N. Figure 1 plots VD 
at different values of  D  .  The following holds 
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Figure 1: Dictator’s Social utility (VD) in the FS model at different values of  D   
 
Let   and  denote the values of D and R where  * D * R D V   is maximum.  The 
solution is easy to work out from the graph. 
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The solution is either D*=N (with D 0.5   ),  D*=N/2 (with  D 0.5   ) or the 
range  *
2
N
DN 

  (with D 0.5   ) with indifference. The range is not an 
equilibrium in a strict sense. All it says is that any value within the range is 
equally good and welfare-maximizing. The FS model can therefore only explain 
corner solutions (D=N and N/2) in the DG, leaving the interior unexplained. 
Now consider application of the model to the UG. Assuming P and R to be 
the pay-offs of the proposer and responder respectively, we can write social utility 
of the proposer and responder, based on equation  (1),  as: 
    max ,0 max ,0 PP P VP P R R P  	 	 	 	     (3) 
  max ,0 max ,0 RR R VR R P P R  	 	 	 	     (4) 
The proposer’s objective is to maximize Vp subject to P+R=N and make an offer 
to the responder good enough to make the responder’s social utility non-negative, 
i.e. the proposer’s objective is therefore to maximize VR subject to P+R=N and  
. They are happy so long as their social utility is non-negative.  0 R V  0 R V   
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within the lower and upper bound will be accepted with certain probability. Offers 
below   will be rejected and those equal to or greater than   will be accepted 
with certainty. This is depicted in 
, oL r
Figure 2.  p r 	 1  and  ,, HL HL p r 	 . The 
following holds under different values of  P  when constraints are implemented: 
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The solution lies on the additional constraint VR=0 when P<0.5, which implies 
an equilibrium offer R
0=r0,iN , on the line BH with indifference when P=0.5, and 
at point B when P>0.5. The reason why the solution of P=0.5 excludes points 
on HE’ is that any offer on HE’ has some probability of rejection, as a result the 
individual with P=0.5 will not be indifferent between BH and HE’. BH will be 
preferred to HE’. 
 
7  


,, , , P
,, P
P
, , ,       when  0.5
, 0.5, , 0.5,       when 0<  0.5      line BH with indifference   
0.5,0.5                                   when  0.5          
oL oH oL oH
OO
oH oH
pp rr
PR
pr
NN



 
       

          

  point B





 
 (5) 
 
 
O 
P V  
B 
C’ 
F’ 
N 
E’ 0.5 P    
0 P    
0.5 P    
A 
2
N
0.5 P    
45
0 
, OL pN  
D’ 
G 
P 
R 0 with lowest  R V    
H 
I 
, OH pN
R 0 with higest  R V    
 
Figure 2: Proposer’s social utility in the ultimatum game in the FS model 
 
The solution in UG is similar to the one in the DG (compare equation (5) with 
(2) and Figure 2 with Figure 1). The only difference is that the corners are now 
determined by the additional constraint  , Oi R rN 
, oH
 rather than R=0. Risk-averse 
proposers will choose to offer closer to   and relatively risk lovers would offer 
close to  . 
r
, oL r
Let us call P =0, selfish-regarding (SR), 0<P <0.5 not so SR or weakly 
other-regarding (WOR), P=0.5 equal regarding (ER) and P >0.5 strongly other-
regarding (SOR). The following conclusions inevitably follow from the FS model; 
a) If there was no fear of rejection at R=0, the solution according to Fehr and 
Schmidt’s formulation will be exactly the same as the DG, the corner 
solution. This leaves the interior solution unexplained.  
b) When there is fear of rejection the right corner solution on  , Oi R rN    
corresponds to 0 0.5 P  
 and it is hard to distinguish between SR and 
WOR individuals. Thus this solution wouldn’t tell us whether preferences 
are weakly other-regarding or selfish. 
c) Knowing that an offer r=0.5 will never be rejected, the SOR 0.5 P    
solution (r=0.5) can only be interpreted as an altruistic solution, which is 
again a corner solution similar to the SOR dictator. 
d) Coming to the ER individual, the solution is again a range   ,  
with indifference which is not a unique interior solution. 
0.5, OH r   
 
8 What points (a) to (d) tell us is that, according to the FS model, a solution 
r=0.5 can be interpreted as a solution with altruism if  , 0.5 OH r  , may possibly be 
interpreted as a solution with fear of rejection (reciprocity) if for some individuals 
. In the first case preferences can be termed as SOR whereas in the 
second case they may or may not be. Given that in the standard dictator 
experiment an r>=0.5 is not always observed, 
, 0.5 OH r 
P
P>0.5 is not dominantly true. This 
means that the preferences of the proposer are either SR or WOR. 
i.e.0 0.5  
. Since SR and WOR have the same solution, the use of other-
regarding preferences for the proposer is irrelevant. The problem with the ER 
solution is obvious. Indifference means any choice is equally good, which is not 
an explanation. Thus interior solutions in the UG in the FS model can be 
interpreted as belonging to a selfish (or WOR) proposer with inequality-averse 
responders. The UG solution of the FS model explains interior offers by proposers 
as a result of fear of rejection, leaving the altruistic part unexplained. 
Coming to application of the V-test and the P-test, the FS model does not 
withstand the V-test. Firstly, it fails to explain interior solutions in the DG. 
Secondly, it fails to explain outcomes across different designs of the UG. If you 
modify the UG such that if a responder rejects an offer, 2 units are subtracted 
from all pay-offs, the model predicts that responders should never reject unequal 
offers (Camerer 2003, p. 112). This is because rejection would reduce pay-off of 
the responder without any effect on inequality. When individuals are inequality-
averse in pay-offs the model automatically fails the P-test. However when we 
replace inequality-aversion in pay-offs by inequality-aversion in utility, the P-test 
is qualified for a special case of equal distribution of utility. This can be 
ascertained by replacing  j x  in the FS model with xj/i in equation (1), which 
becomes a special case of the model (ei=1, implying equality in utility) in this 
paper and passes the P-test, as we shall see later. 
3.2.  The BO (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) Model 
The social welfare function of an individual i in the BO model is given (ignoring 
the xi+xj=0 case) by 
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Notice that Vi is linearly increasing in xi  and non-linearly decreasing in 
inequality. Recall that Fehr and Schmidt (1999) blamed linearity of the social 
utility function in advantageous inequity for the inability of their model to explain 
interior outcomes in the DG. (6) is nonlinear in inequality. The BO model is 
therefore the FS model with nonlinear inequality aversion.  
9 Consider application of the model to the DG. The dictator’s objective is to 
maximize (6) subject to  ij x xN , which gives
*2 1
2
i
i
i
a
x NN
b
  and 
*2 1
2
i
j
i
a
x NN
b
	 . 
The first problem with the solution is obvious. Pay-offs are non-linearly 
related to the size of the pie. Whereas this may be seen desirable at very high 
values of N, experiments with relatively higher N show that outcomes are not too 
sensitive to the value of N (Camerer 2003).  
This model can explain interior solutions in the standard DG, it cannot, 
however adequately explain variety of the dictator games played (the V-test). For 
example consider the DG where individual i and j are given 10 dollars each. The 
dictator is given the option of either sharing his/her 10 dollars with the recipient or 
taking some of the recipient’s money, as in Bardsley (2005). The BO model will 
give the same solution as the standard DG. These games do not give the same 
results in practice. Similarly, Camerer (2003, p. 111) notes that if you modify the 
UG such that when the responder rejects a proposal, the monetary payoffs are 10 
per cent of the original offer,  relative shares will be the same no matter whether 
the responder accepts or rejects. Thus the responder will always accept any offer; 
no matter how unequal it is (since the utility from rejection will be lower than the 
utility with acceptance). This shows that the model fails to pass the V-test.  
It is a bit hard to implement the P-test here as the model is defined over pay-
offs, not utility. One possibility is to think of xi and xj as utilities and replace xj 
with xj/!The equilibrium value of 
*
j x  is ambiguously related to but increasing 
with  at relatively high ai/bi and decreasing at relatively lower values of ai/bi.  
3.3.  The CFG (Cox, Friedman and Gjerstad 2007) Model 
The model is given by 
1
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where r is the reciprocity and s is the state variable. When r=s=0,  0 ii ##$ 
which could be positive, negative or zero, implying a benevolent, malevolent or 
selfish player. Consider application of the game to the DG with status. 
0 i as i ## 	 $ . s=1 when individuals earn property rights to the sum N and 0 if 
the sum was manna from experimental heaven.  The dictator’s objective is to 
maximize     ii i i Vx N x
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10 
Notice that, depending upon the value of  i #  and " , the model explains the 
corner as well as interior solution observed in laboratory experiments. Empirical estimates of the model in Cox et al. (2007) yield  1 "   and a>0. 
This implies that  0
i dx
ds
 . Intuitively the dictator decreases his/her weight  i #  on 
utility of the recipient when s=1. This implies that the model passes the V-test. 
In its application to the DG and UG, Cox et al. (2007, p. 25 and 32) restrict 
"  to be  0 (by mistake 
1). Cox et al. (2007) empirically estimate the value of "  
and find that it is >0 and <1 in all empirical estimations
2. To see if the model 
passes the P-test at the restricted values of " , let us consider an alternative 
scenario where the recipient is less efficient in deriving satisfaction from a unit of 
pay-off than the dictator. The model can be reproduced as  

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d
  when 0<" <1, implying that the dictator will be less altruistic 
towards the less efficient individuals, which is the opposite of what psychological 
intuition would predict
3. Thus the model fails the P-test at the estimated value of 
" . Qualification of the P-test requires " <0.  
It will become clear later on that the CFG model with " <0 is a special case 
of the model proposed in this paper.
4. Equity-bias: Equity vs Equality 
Most of the inequity-aversion models, with rare exceptions such as the CFG, are 
models of inequality-aversion than inequity aversion. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
note: 
“The determination of the relevant reference group and the relevant 
reference outcome for a given class of individuals is ultimately an 
empirical question. The social context, the saliency of particular agents, 
and the social proximity among individuals are all likely to influence 
reference groups and outcomes. Because in the following we restrict 
attention to individual behavior in economic experiments, we have to make 
assumptions about reference groups and outcomes that are likely to prevail 
in this context. In the laboratory it is usually much simpler to define what is 
perceived as an equitable allocation by the subjects. The subjects enter the 
laboratory as equals, they do not know anything about each other, and they 
are allocated to different roles in the experiment at random. Thus, it is 
natural to assume that the reference group is simply the set of subjects 
                                                 
1 Their argument is that for  <0, utility is -  at xj=0 (which is observed in the data) so we must 
have   0. This condition is not necessary as the solution can be explained by a  i=0 for any   or 
by  i<1 with  =1. 
2 The estimated value of " changes in these estimations which needs justification.  
11 
3 This points towards issues related to the estimation procedures adopted in Cox et el. 2007, which 
is worth investigating but is outside the scope of the paper. 12 
                                                
playing against each other and that the reference point, i.e., the equitable 
outcome, is given by the egalitarian outcome” (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, pp 
821-22) 
Assuming individuals to be equal during experiments is an oversimplification 
which is not true in all contexts. Once an experimenter assigns subjects into 
different roles, through whatever procedure, and gives them unequal property 
rights, they cease to be equal. For example, a dictator with all the power to give 
something or nothing to another player is not equal to the passive recipient who 
has no claim over the amount given to him/her. There are biases that are hard-
wired into them, such as self-serving bias, which interact with the subjects’ 
heterogeneous socio-economic background and real-life experiences (and their 
experience in the laboratory); this in turn affect their choices when given the 
power to do so. Bias in roles therefore leads to bias in ones idea of equitable 
distribution. It is therefore not right to assume that other-regarding individuals are 
universally inequality-averse irrespective of context. A reasonable postulation, in 
general, would be to think of one’s idea of equitable distribution as state-
dependent, where the state is determined by psychological and structural 
parameters. Psychological parameters primarily include tendencies that are either 
hard-wired into human nature, such a self-serving bias, or a part of one’s culture; 
ones real-life experiences (including experience in the laboratory); one’s 
perception about the behavior of others (kind, selfish etc); and one’s perception 
about his/her socio-economic status relative to those of others. The “structural 
parameters” mainly relate to design of the experiment (such as how are different 
roles and property rights allocated, information about the socio-economic status of 
players, wording of the experiment, and role of the experimenter etc).  
Let us define three different states, Fair (F), Superior (S), and inferior (INF). 
Given individual-specific psychological tendencies/parameters, every 
experimental design assigns one of the three states to players. When assigned a 
fair state, one’s idea of equity is a fair one (i.e. equal distribution); and when 
assigned a superior state (S) or inferior (INF) states, one’s idea of equity is a 
biased one. Let Ei=xi/xj be the measure of equity of an individual i over xi (own 
pay-off) and xj (other’s pay-off). When i is assigned a fair state, F, his/her idea of 
an equitable distribution is a fair one, i.e. Ei=1. However, when assigned a biased 
state, S or INF, he/she is emotionally locked into choosing a biased Ei=1+bi 
where bi quantifies equity-bias and assumes a non-zero value. In state S, bi>0 and 
i values more than fair distribution as equitable distribution. Similarly, bi<0 in 
state INF and i accepts/values less than fair distributions as equitable.  
For example, in the DG, a dictator is assigned a state superior than the one 
assigned to the recipient. The dictator owns all the money and is assigned the right 
to use it as he/she pleases. The recipient is neither a party to the “production” of 
value nor legally entitled to receive any share of the money
4. Thus, when 
behaving altruistically, he/she does not necessarily find it equitable to split the pie 
equally. Competition basically changes the relative location of players on the 
equity-bias chart, and hence their idea of equitable share. Similarly, a recipient in 
the ultimatum game is assigned an inferior state, and may accept less than fair 
offers as equitable. This plays an important role in explaining dynamics of the 
outcomes in variety of the two games, and other games of the same sort, as we 
shall see later.  
 
4 Even though it is possible for him/her to think of the sum as a result of the experiment to which 
the other player is also a party to some extent, which morally entitles him/her to some share. 5. The Model
With the above discussion in mind, let us generalize the FS model of inequality-
aversion to a model of inequity-aversion. 
Let  
i x     =  pay-off of individual i 
 ii ux  =  idiosyncratic selfish utility function of individual i from own 
pay-off  i x  
 , ji j ux
 
=  selfish utility of individual j as perceived by individual i from 
pay-off  of individual j  j x . 
i e   =  the equitable distribution of utility as perceived by individual 
i expressed as own-utility relative to utility of the other 
individual 
 
The generalized FS model is given below 
                  
     ,0 ,0 ii i i i i i j i j i i j i j i i V u x max u x eu x max eu x u x    	 	 	 	     (7) 
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i ' >1 and  ii   .  
The restrictions on the first and second derivatives of the idiosyncratic 
selfish utilities imply diminishing/constant marginal utility of money. i   is the 
social marginal utility of a unit decrease in advantageous inequity referred to as 
the social beta of individual i. Similarly,  i   is the social marginal utility of a unit 
decrease in disadvantageous inequity referred to as social alpha. The logic behind 
the value of  i   and the restriction on  i '  will be justified later in the paper. It 
might however be helpful to point out that this restriction is needed to explain 
interior outcomes and ensures that social utility is maximum at the equitable 
distribution of pay-offs. In the FS model this restriction was  1/2 i   , which in 
our notation is equivalent to 
2
i
i
'
   with  i ' >1. The restriction on  i   could be 
replaced with  i  >1 (as  i  >1 always implies 
1 	
'
' 1
ij
ii
i
u
e
u

 
 &%   &%   
, see Appendix B 
for proof). In order to understand the dynamics generated by the value of social 
beta and its interpretation, I will stick to the general restriction on social beta as 
above. 
Without loss of generality, let us impose constant marginal utility of 
money and assume: 
  ii i ux fx x  i        ( 8 )  
 
j
ji j j
ii
j x x
ux g x f
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   
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     (9) where 0 i   ,  i f x  is the preference technology of individual i, which converts 
i x  into utility and   is the preference technology of individual j, as 
perceived by individual i, which converts 
 ij gx
j x  into the utility of j. The fact that the 
preference technology f may not necessarily be equal to g captures dynamics of 
differences in socio-economic status of players that leads to equity-bias in pay-
offs. In the specification in equation (9),  i   embodies individual i’s belief about 
the socio-economic status of individual j relative to his/her own socio-economic 
status. For example, when individual i believes he/she is socially better off than 
individual j (say because of j’s disability or because j is poor relative to i),  i   is 
greater than 1. i  >1 implies that i believes that j is less efficient in deriving 
satisfaction from a dollar than i him/herself or a dollar given to j generates lesser 
utility than it does to i (vise-versa for  i  <1). Appendix C derives the utility 
function in equation (7) as a monotonic transformation of a social utility function 
that explicitly models differences in socio-economic status
5.  
Substituting (8) and (9) in (7) gives 
  ,0 ,0 iii ii j i i ji V x max x E x max E x x    	 	 	 	      (10) 
where  
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Ei is the equitable distribution of pay-offs (not utility) as perceived by 
individual i and ei is an equivalent measure in terms of utility. The value of this is 
determined by equity-bias as Ei=1+bi where bi is equity-bias as discussed earlier. 
When an individual is assigned a fair state, the value of Ei is equal to 1 (bi=0), 
when assigned a superior state Ei>1 (bi>0) and when assigned an inferior state 
Ei<1 (bi<0).  
Notice that I mainly define states and bias in terms of pay-offs for 
convenience. It is possible for these states to be different in terms of utility. For 
example, consider a fair state in utility (i.e. ei=1), which implies Ei=1/i.  Ei 
could be less than, equal to or greater than one (depending upon whether i is 
greater, equal to, or less than one respectively) which corresponds to positive, 
zero, and negative equity bias respectively. Thus one can think of an individual 
belonging to a superior state in utility and possibly belonging to any of the three 
states in pay-offs and vise versa.  
The players’ objective is to maximize (10) subject to xi+xj=N. Figure 3 panel 
(a) plots Vi at different values of 'i. The following holds: 
                   when  0
                   when when 0< 1        C<D<E
                    when  1
                    when  1                      F<E  
i
i
i
i
i
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ABD
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ABE
ABF
'
'
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'
 
      
  
 
                                                 
5  Note that laboratory experiments are conducted in a controlled environment; it is 
possible for the impact of these problems to be minimized, if not completely avoided. 
When experiments are blind or double blind, self-serving bias may still be at play.  
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Figure 3 : Equilibrium of the Vi maximizing individual in the generalized model of 
inequity-aversion.
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The solution can be summarized thus: 
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 as discusses below. 
With  i ' >1, the problem reduces to minimization of the deviation of the 
inequity gap from zero, iii j I xE x 	 , which occurs at  0 i I  ii j x Ex ( (see Fi
tion                               j
gure 
3 panel (b))  Thus equilibrium is the solution to the following two equations: 
 0 I  equa i   ii x Ex        ( 1 1 )  
and the budget constraint                 ij x xN                                   (12) 
Solving (11) and (12) gives 
16 
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. 
The solution is simply the intersection of  0 i I   curve and the budget constraint, 
This equilibrium solution can also be arrived at using a CES (Constant 
Elas
of th
as shown in panel (c) of Figure 3. 
 
ticity of Substitution) social utility function under conditions required to 
ensure conformity to the P-test. Section   6 derives and discusses the issue in detail. 
As a passing note, sometimes it might be easier to work with another version 
e model given below: 
 ,0 ,0         iii ij i i i j i Vx m a x xxb N m a x b N xx   	 		 	 	          
where  i 0.5 and  ii      . Maximization subject to  ij x xN  gives 
  1 ii 0.5 x bN   and     0.5 1 ji x bN 	 , where   
i b  captures  s.  equity-bia 
i b =0 
 e equity-bias and   b <0 means negative 
equity-bias. The paper will mainly stick to the specification in 10)
means no equity-bias,  i b >0 means positiv i
 (
5.1.  Application to the Dictator Game
Let D be pay-off of the dictator, and R be pay-off of the recipient. Based on 
. 
equation (10), social utility of the dictator can be written as: 
    ,0 ,0 V D max D E R max E R D  	 	 	 	   DD DD D   (13) 
where 
1
D
D
D E
'
 

 and  1 D '  . 
Maximization of equation (13) subject to D+R=N gives 
*
*
1
D
D
E D
d
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. 
Theoretically  D '  can assume any value. We restricted it to greater than 1 ( D ' >1) 
in the model because it ensures unique interior solutions observed i the 
laboratory experiments. This is why we assumed this value of social beta in the 
model and restricted 
n 
D '  to be greater than unity. This is proved in proposition 2 
below. 
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Proposition 1: The equilibrium offer, 1-d*, made by the dictator varies 
roof:  As
with state-dependent equity-bias and can be anywhere between 0 and 1 
inclusive. 
 
11
1*
12 D D
d
Eb
	 

P . Theoretically, the equity-bias can take any 
egative value. Thus,  positive or n when the dictator’s valuation of equity is 
infinitely biased, the offer will be equal to zero (i.e.   1*0 D bd ( 	  ). 
When the dictator’s valuation is negatively biased, say  D b 1 	 , the offer is equal 
to 1;  D b =0 means the dictator is in a fair state and split m fairly, i.e. half-
half. The less than infinitely equity-biased dictator in a superior state (i.e. 
0 D b   ) will give offers in the interior 
s the su
 0.5 1 * 0 d 	   and the dictator in an 
ate with  1 0 D b 	   will  interior solution in 
 0 1 * 0.5 d 	  . 
infer st ior lead to the 
Proposition 2: Any  1 0* d 

  is a unique other-regarding equilibrium 
roof: For d* to be a unique equilibrium
with   1* D d  	
P   D '  has to be greater than 1. Recall that  
1
D
D
D E
'
  . 
 
1
11 * DD D d '  (  (  	 . The interpretation of this 
1 D E 
condition is straight forward. The dictator will have to sacrifice  
1
dollars to reduce advantageous inequity by 1 unit. The one u  
inequity will increase social utility by
1*
1 D
d
E
	

 
nit reduction in
D  . Thus for the dictator to find it optimal 
to sacrifice an extra dollar, it must in rease his/her social-utility more than the 
sacrifice in terms of selfish utility. 
The model clearly explains the corner as well as interior outcomes observed 
durin
c
g experiments. This model acknowledges that individuals are heterogeneous 
and differ in their valuation of equity; hence their social utility is maximized at 
different offers. This leads them to optimally offer different amounts. In fact the 
corner solution, which is the selfish Nash equilibrium, can also be interpreted as 
an equitable equilibrium with ED= . 
Recall that the restriction on  i   ensures that social utility has a maximum, at 
the 
a
ame
Now consider application of the model to the standard ultimatum game 
experiment. Let P be pay-off of the proposer and R be pay off of the responder. 
state-dependent equitable distribution. The social beta is inversely related 
to i E , implying that for a relatively larger equity-bias, a relatively lower social 
bet  is required for the social utility to have a maximum. 
5.2.  Application of the Model to the Ultimatum G18 
be written (using 
equation (10)) as: 
The utility function of the proposer and the responder can 
  ,0 ,0 PP P P P V P max P E R max E R P  	 	 	 	     (14) 
  ,0 ,0 RR R max R E P max E P R  		 	 RR VR  	     (15) 
The proposer’s objective is to maximize (14) subject to P+R=N.  The 
proposer’s offer will be equal to 
1
1
O
P
R N
E

   
, le
amo
aving the responder an 
unt
1
O P
P
E
PN

 &%
 
. If this offer is accepted by the responder, both will keep 
the positive sum; if rejected both w g zero. The responder will 
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6 An alternative approach would be to maximize social utility of the responder and workout the 
minimum acceptable threshold at minimum ER. The social utility at this equilibrium may be equal 
to or greater than zero. This innovation however does not buy the model any interesting insight. 
7 It is possible for some players to find R
0>R
A offensive and reject them (this is when 
R
0>RERN/('R-1)). I ignore such a possibility in discussions but the model does allow for such 
interpretations and solution. 19 
Since, in practice, we may have agents with different equity-biases, let us 
capture this heterogeneity by expressing   of an individual of type n (=1,…..n) 
by  , which is distributed with support  and   belongs to a 
res
A P
An P
AH P
AL P . 
AH P
ponder with the highest minimum acceptable offer (
AH R ) and 
AL P  belongs to a 
responder with the lowest minimum acceptable offer (
AL R ). Thus the outcome of 
the experiment will depend on whom the proposer is playing with. Consider 
Figure 4, where the proposer’s utility is maximum at point B
O OE   and 
O
,  P
R NE  . The equilibrium is: 
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Figure 4: Equilibrium in the ultimatum game for the generalized model 
of inequity-aversion. 
Of course, when E=C the e offer will always be accepted 
spective of type of the responder. The (0,0) equilibrium implies that the 
roposer does not offer more than NE because he/she thinks it is inequitable and 
should be accepted by any responder; if not, he/she is happy to face the 
 proposer’s equitabl
irre
p
consequences. Here the proposer can clearly be classified as other-regarding, 
unlike the FS model. The responder, on the other hand, rejects the offer, believing 
that it is less that what would make him/her just happy. The main reason for this 
rejection is that the offer is less than the minimum acceptable threshold. This 
rejection could be motivated by reciprocity, intentions, social punishment, self-
assertiveness or any other reason. When rejections inflict monetary losses to 
proposers (as in the ultimatum game), all of these reasons could be in play. 
Impunity games narrow down the list to social punishment and self-assertiveness. 
When  1 P ' 
 , the solution is similar to the FS model as discussed earlier. 20 
6.
odel is a special case of the generalized model in this paper. 
The generalized model reduces to the FS model when Ei=1 which is relevant only 
Comparison with Representative Models of the 
Literature:
As obvious, the FS m
when players are assigned into a fair state. The generalized model allows Ei to 
vary with state which is related to changes in equity-bias. Recall that in the FS 
model, the other-regarding behavior of the proposer was irrelevant for interior 
solution in the UG, whereas it is not irrelevant in the generalized model as the 
solution is not necessarily determined by the VR=0 constraint (see Figure 4). As 
indicated earlier, the FS model cannot explain interior solutions in the DG. Fehr 
and Schmidt argue that this is because of the piecewise linearity of preferences in 
advantageous inequity and that introducing non-linearity in the advantageous 
inequity could resolve the issue. As shown earlier, the BO model is the FS model 
with the proposed non-linearity. This specification however, like the FS model, 
fails the V-test (and, at some values of the preference parameters, the P-test). This 
paper shows that the nonlinearity is not necessarily needed to explain interior 
outcomes. Unlike the FS and BO models, the generalized model simultaneously 
passes the two proposed tests.  
When i =-i, the generalized model reduces to: 
       1 ii i i i i i j i j i i i Vu u x e ux u x   	     ii j i j eu x  x   	 	            (16) 
Assuming i<1, this is equivalent to the CFG model with 
1
i
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i
e
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. As 
obv equity (whic
consistent with the FS m
quires diminishing marginal 
l
y of dictator and ultimatum games 
experimental economists have tested in the laboratory. Even though solutions of 
                                                
ious, the CFG model is decreasing in advantageous in h is 
odel and the model in this paper) and increasing in 
disadvantageous inequity which is the opposite of what is postulated in the FS 
model and its extension here
8. As shown earlier, the CFG model fails the P-test 
when   0. Imposing i =-i therefore comes at the cost of the P-test unless   is 
restricted to non-positive values. No such restriction is needed in the generalized 
model when i>-i/' which includes any positive i. 
Similarly, when  =1, indifference curves are linear and would give corner 
solution only (xi=1 or 0). The CFG model therefore re
utility of money to explain interior outcomes, the model in this paper doesn’t as it 
can explain any solution at any given  . 
7. Application of the Mode
As mentioned earlier, there are a variet
the model in this paper were derived for the standard dictator and ultimatum 
games, they can easily be applied to different designs, contexts and multiple 
player versions of these games. All we need to do is work out what impact would 
a particular innovation to an experimental design have on the relative state of 
players and for that matter their equity-bias and predictions about the solution 
 
8 Fehr and Schmidt (1999) cites empirical evidence to support ii>0. 21 
ecipient is neither a party to the creation of value, 
nor 
ce, and design of 
the 
na from heaven”, if the dictator is made to feel as if he 
earn
follow intuitively. Understandably, it may not be possible in some cases to predict 
what impact a particular innovation to an experimental design would have on the 
relative state of a player beforehand; experiments could be used to understand the 
dynamics of such innovations on states. Similarly, laboratory experiments could 
be used to quantify the impact of alternative policy tools on equity-bias which will 
help in choosing efficient policies. The notion of equity-bias is general in nature 
and embodies all information related to socio-economic status, intentions, 
reciprocity, social distance, design of the experiment role of the experimenter, etc. 
The model therefore provides a unified framework to understand outcomes of the 
research in a broader context.
In the standard DG, the state assigned to a dictator is superior than the one 
assigned to the receiver. The r
legally entitled to any share in the sum. Thus it seems natural for the dictator 
to have a notion of equity that is biased towards his/her welfare and make offers 
in the interior. The ultimatum game introduces two changes to the DG. Firstly, it 
lowers the status of the dictator to a relatively inferior position by assigning 
him/her the role of a proposer. Secondly, it alleviates the status of the recipient to 
that of a responder who becomes an active partner to the creation of value. This 
arrangement leads to a reduction in equity-bias of the dictator (now the proposer) 
and an improvement in equity-bias of the recipient (now responder). In a one-shot 
ultimatum game the proposer is in a relatively superior state than the responder 
(by just being the first mover), which allows for the possibility of less than fair 
splits as equitable offers. In a repeated ultimatum game their relative states 
converge to a fair state and the offers converge to an even split.  
The wording of the experiment and instruction list (Bolton  et al.. 1998; 
Hoffman et al. 1999), identity of the experimenter, social distan
experiment seem to have an impact on outcomes (Hoffman et al. 1994; 1996). 
All these factors change the relative positions of players in the game, and hence 
their equity-bias, which show up in their offers and changes in the threshold for 
accepting or rejecting offers. Hoffman et al. (1994), for example, found reduction in 
offers by dictators when anonymity was increased, implying that anonymity 
increases equity-bias. This means that part of the altruism in the DG is to avoid 
being labeled as too selfish, to look good or not to look bad. Similarly, the 
experiment by Bra as-Garza (2006) cited earlier, which introduces poverty in the 
DG, concludes that informing the dictator about the poverty of the recipient leads 
to more altruism. Again, this is because information about the socio-economic 
status of players leads to changes in relative states and equity-biases, which leads 
to different outcomes.  
Camerer and Thaler (1995 p. 216) mentioned that when instead of giving the 
dictator a sum as “man
ed the right to the sum, then sharing shrinks. Making the dictator feel as if 
he/she earned the right to the sum basically changes his/her location to a relatively 
more superior (from superior to more superior) state, which leads to an increase in 
his emotional state of equity-bias. Similarly, Schotter  et al. (1996) introduced 
property rights in two-stage-survival dictator and ultimatum games. In the first 
stage proposers were competing with each other in offering higher amounts to a 
single responder. They earn property rights to the sum when a proposer accepts 
the responder’s offer. They move to the second stage with property rights they 
earned in the first state. In the second stage they offered lesser amounts and 
responders rejected smaller amounts less often. The offers were still significantly 
higher than zero and considered to be fair by player 2. This is because earning 22 
 (i) First, assume that the dictator is given $20 to share 
with
and increasing the 
resp
 show that competition can push 
Inform le in positioning players on the 
state/bias chart and so may intentions. About the role of intentions in rejections in 
property rights in the second stage increased equity-bias of the proposers. The 
responders also made note of that and respected it by revising their lowest 
threshold (less biased). 
Similarly, structure/design of the experiment also plays a role. Consider two 
types of dictator games.
 another anonymous recipient. (ii) Second, consider the same two players 
now given 10 dollars each, with the dictator having the option of giving or taking 
away up to 10 dollars. Both experiments involve sharing 20 dollars but 
individuals are not located on the same position on the bias-chart. The dictator in 
(i) is in a more superior state than in (ii). Thus we will expect the share of the 
dictator in (ii) to be lower than, or at least as much as, in (i). Similarly, in the 
ultimatum game we would expect the responder in (ii) to reject offers higher than 
in (i); this is because he/she is not in as inferior state in (ii) as he/she is in (i). The 
model also gives insight into why the hypotheses in experiments such as Bardsley 
(2005) are erroneous and provide a context for explaining results of his 
experiment. Bardsley hypothesized that the standard DG would give the same 
solution if the sum was instead distributed and the dictator was given the option of 
(giving and) taking money from the recipient. Arguing that the dictator is facing a 
similar problem of allocating the same budget, optimal allocation should be the 
same. The key assumption in Barsley’s argument is that preferences of the 
dictator are the same in the two experiments. The model in this paper postulates 
that preferences are state-dependent and the two models belong to two different 
states; expecting it to give the same solution is simply wrong. 
An increase in competition on the proposer’s side is expected to reduce the 
proposer’s  equity-bias, leading to relatively larger offers 
onder’s equity-bias, leading to rejection of relatively larger offers. However, 
if proposers were to compete for lowest offers, the proposer’s equity-bias is 
expected to increase, leading to smaller offers, and that  of the responders is 
expected to move further away from fair offers, leading them to accept relatively 
lower offers. This holds only if the responders are aware of the nature of the 
competition. Camerer and Thaler (1995) writes;
“A good general theory of fairness predicts that fair-minded players behave self-
interestedly in some situations. Two experiments
ultimatum offers closer to zero, in ways consistent with fairness. Schotter et al. 
(1994) created competition among Proposers. Eight Proposers made offers in a 
first stage. The four who earned the most in the first-stage game could then play a 
second-stage game (with a different player). Sensible fairness theories would say 
that Proposers now have an excuse for making low offers-they must compete for 
the right to play again-so low offers are not as unfair, and Responders will accept 
them more readily. That is what happened.” 
ation asymmetry may also play its ro
ultimatum games,  Fehr and Schmidt (2005) conclude “Taken together, the 
evidence from Blount (1995), Kagel et al. (1996), Offerman (1999), Brandts and 
Sola (2001) and Falk et al. (2000a, 2000b, 2003) supports the view that subjects 
want to punish unfair intentions or unfair types. Although the evidence provided 
by the initial study of Blount was mixed, the subsequent studies indicate a clear 
role of these motives.”  23 
hips were convertible to monetary pay-offs at different 
pric
ositions proposers in a relatively superior state and 
they
ents such as Blount (1995) and Falk et al. 
(200
icity of models of other-regarding 
preferences proposed in the literature on experimental and behavioral economics 
 Schmidt (1999) assume that 
sub
Similarly, in experiments by Kagel et al. (1996) where subjects had to divide 
100 chips in an UG, c
es across players. For example in one treatment responders’ chips were valued 
10 cents each and that of proposers 30 cents each. Players knew their own 
conversion rate but not necessarily that of others. When the proposer is aware that 
his/her chips are valued three times more than that of the responder, an equal 
monetary split would require the proposer to give 75 chips to the responder. When 
the information was available to responders, they rejected unequal money splits 
more frequently than when they were not aware of the difference in chips’ money 
value. Thus unequal proposals were rejected at higher rates than unintentional 
unequal proposals (Fehr and Schmidt, 2005). Similarly, another important insight 
of the experiment was that proposers offered close to 50 percent when there was 
information asymmetry. This implies that proposers prefer to seem fair than be 
fair. Camerer and Thaler (1995) believes this is “an important reminder that self-
interested behavior is alive and well, even in ultimatum games”. This also points 
towards an important distinction between altruism/fairness as a natural instinct 
and altruism/fairness as a code or altruism as an instinct complemented by 
religious or moral affiliations.  
This could intuitively be predicted by the model as well. Information 
asymmetry in this experiment p
 make offers closer to 50% than 75%. This is when they prefer to seem fair 
than act fair. What the model also predicts is that individuals with commitment to 
moral codes through say religious or cultural affiliations would offer closer to the 
75%. Information asymmetry should as such not change their relative state. It will 
be interesting to investigate whether or not individuals with different religious 
affiliation would behave differently. 
Similarly it can be shown that the framework in this paper explains the wide 
variety of data in laboratory experim
3). The framework also provides a rationale for the three-player games by 
Güth and Damme (1998),  Kagel and Wolf (2001), and Berby-Meyer and 
Nuedereke (2005) by invoking player and design-specific equity bias. 
8. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper takes note of the variety and multipl
and points towards the need for certain criteria to judge these models. The paper 
identifies two tests, the Variety Test (ability of a model to explain outcomes under 
variety or alternative scenarios) and the Psychological Test (ability of a model to 
conform to psychological intuition), that can be used to judge any model of other-
regarding preferences. It is argued that, for a mathematical model to qualify as a 
social welfare function, it must simultaneously pass the two tests. It is shown that 
none of the models proposed to date passes the two tests simultaneously with the 
exception of the Cox et al. (2007) model which simultaneously passes the two 
tests when some additional restrictions are imposed.  
This paper extends the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model of inequality-aversion 
to a generalized model of inequity-aversion. Fehr and
jects enter laboratory as equals and should therefore use egalitarian outcome as 
a reference outcome. This is why the Fehr and Schmidt model cannot explain 
interior outcomes in the dictator game. This paper argues that once assigned into 
different roles and given unequal property rights, subjects cease to be equal and 24 
gn of 
the
amework to 
und
It rationalized all kind of choices, smart or 
oth
equal-distribution is not necessarily the equitable norm. The paper introduces the 
concept of equity-bias and postulates that one’s idea of equitable distribution is 
state-dependent where state is determined by psychological and structural 
parameters. The state could be fair, superior or inferior. When assigned a fair 
state, one’s valuation of equity is a fair one (even split), and when assigned a 
biased-state (superior or inferior) one’s valuation of equity is a biased one. i.e. 
bias in state leads to bias  in equity. Individuals in a fair state have zero equity-
bias and split the pie evenly. Those in a superior (inferior) state have positive 
(negative) equity-bias and value more (less) than a fair distribution as an equitable 
distribution. Bias in state therefore leads to bias in equity. Given the psychological 
tendencies/state of an individual, every experimental design assigns one of the 
three states to the player, which leads to individual-specific valuation of equity. 
Predictions about outcomes in different experiments, or the same experiment with 
different designs, can be made through predicting its impact on equity-bias.  
The notion of equity-bias is general in nature and embodies all information 
related to socio-economic status, intentions, reciprocity, social distance, desi
 experiment, role of the experimenter, etc. The model therefore is all-
encompassing and provides a unified framework to understand outcomes of 
research in a broader context. For example, in the standard dictator game, the 
state assigned to the dictator is superior than the one assigned to the receiver. This 
is because the recipient is neither a party to the creation of value, nor legally 
entitled to any share in the sum. Thus it seems natural for the dictator to have a 
notion of equity that is biased towards his/her welfare. The standard ultimatum 
game introduces two changes to the dictator game. Firstly, it assigns the dictator 
the role of the proposer, which reduces his/her superiority and secondly, it 
alleviates the status of the recipient to that of a responder who becomes an active 
partner to the creation of value. This arrangement leads to reduction in the equity-
bias of the dictator (now the proposer) and increase in the equity-bias of the 
recipient (now the responder). Thus the fear of rejection, along with other factors, 
changes equity-bias of the players, hence equitable distribution. This is the main 
reason why offers in the dictator game are positive but lower than in the 
ultimatum game. Competition changes the relative position of the players and 
their valuation of equitable distribution. So does the design of experiments, such 
as the way property rights are assigned (e.g. earned or manna from heaven), the 
wording of the experiment/instructions, role of the experimenter etc. 
The model is more general than its previous counterparts. It parsimoniously 
explains interior solutions in the dictator game and provides a fr
erstand outcomes in other experiments. It provides a framework to understand 
why outcomes change with design of the experiment and across different 
experiments of the same nature. 
The framework in this paper is simple and doesn’t require individuals to 
process complex information. 
erwise, as state-dependent other-regarding utility maximizing outcomes. Policy 
makers can benefit from understanding the evolution of relative states and equity 
biases. The effectiveness of alternative policy reforms could be explored in the 
laboratory through its impact on equity-bias. Research therefore should be 
directed to unfold the dynamics and evolution of equitable states relevant to 
policy debates and positive analysis of issues of interest. The model provides a 
framework to understand the relevance and importance of equity-bias which is 
determined by psychological (natural tendencies as as self-serving bias, individual 
characteristics etc) and structural parameters (design of the experiment, the 25 
their impact on equity-bias for organized conclusions. 
The
005). Altruism or Artefact? A Note on Dictator Game Giving
manner in which property rights are assigned, wording of the experiment, real 
world scenarios etc). Laboratory experiments could be used to determine the 
evolution of these states. 
The existing literature and experimental results obtained thus far can be re-
organized in the light of 
 framework can also be used to understand outcomes of other games, such as 
public good and trust games.  
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A of the Linear 
Model
Charness-Rabin (quasi-maximin preferences) can be written as under (in a two 
player environment with xi+xj=1 ) 
W
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The model reduces to 
Fehr and Schmidt’s 1999 model with   . i.e. 
 max ,0   iii ij Vx xx   	 	    
The fact that  0 i    makes the model inferior under the specification as it 
would give corner solution in both the dictator game as well as the ultimatum 
game.  
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The condition can further be simplified as ell. Proposition 2 shows that this 
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i has the following social utility function 
APPENDIX C:  Derivation of the Main Model 
Assume the individual 
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  and  i ' >1. 
w stands for wealth and )  quantifies the efficiency/inefficiency with which 
individuals convert pay-offs into utility. The subscript ij on represents individuals 
i belief about individual j since i doesn’t have perfect information about j’s utility, 
wealth and efficiency. 
Notice that selfish utility is determined by pay-off relative to wealth which 
basically acknowledges the fact that a dollar received by a wealthier person 
gene  by a p rson. T ter  rates lesser utility than when it is received oor pe he parame
)  is ther erence techn logy. W j e to capture heterogeneity in pref o hen  ii )   ) 
individ  more efficient in converting a dollar into utility than individua
tion therefore acknowledges soc omic  f 
arguments. W social utility function 

ual i is l j 
(because of some socio-economic feature other than wealth, say disability). This 
specifica io-econ status as one o the 
determinant of selfish utility generated by pay-offs.   
Let us assume the selfish utility functions are homogeneous of degree k in its 
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which is the model in the paper. As argued,  i   in the model captures individual 
ic status relative to that of individual  j.   i’s valuation of his/her socio-econom
 